Partition Obvious Preference and Mistrust in Mechanism Design: Theory and Experiment

题目:Partition Obvious Preference and Mistrust in Mechanism Design: Theory and Experiment (机制设计中的边际理性与信任缺失:理论及实验)

主讲人:Luyao Zhang,Ohio State University


时间:2018年11月19号 1:30到3:00


地点:武东路100号上海财经大学中欧平台武东路校区114


摘要:

Substantial evidence in field, laboratory, and thought experiments in multiple disciplines show that decision makers often choose a dominated strategy, which contradicts the current economic theory. Moreover, experimental evidence shows that the choice of dominated strategies in some mechanisms are significantly reduced in their counterparts. To bridge this gap between theory and reality, we firstly propose two alternative axiomatic approaches: formalizing a distinct anomaly in human reasoning that agents fail to reason state-by-state and tying together a broad range of evidence for the choice of dominated strategies. Secondly, we extend the concept to game theory and mechanism design, where we identify a large class of mechanisms that successfully achieve desirable goals even with boundedly rational agents or agents who mistrust the market makers. Thirdly, we test and verify our theory and its implications in a laboratory experiment with a crossover design that enables pooled data, within-subject, and cross-subject comparisons in both decision problems and games. Finally, we address how our approach contributes to accomplishing two goals simultaneously in modeling bounded rationality: providing a unified framework that subsumes existing ones as limiting cases and stimulating transdisciplinary conversations connecting the concepts of heuristics and emotions in psychology, the utilization of eye-tracking technology in neuroscience, and considerations of the moral foundation underlying a mechanism design in ethics.


 

主讲人介绍:

Luyao Zhang is a Ph.D. Candidate holding Presidential Fellowship at the Ohio State University, and her research is supported by the National Science Foundation Dissertation Grant. Before her overseas studies in the U.S., she graduated from Peking University with a B.A. in Economics and a B.S. in Mathematics. She has been striving to be a microeconomi



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