题目：Mergers and Merger Waves under Incomplete Information

时间：5月29日下午1:30-3:00

地点：中欧平台武东路校区106

演讲者：，从佳佳，助理教授，复旦大学

摘要：Our study provides an explanation to why mergers tend to occur in waves. In the paper, participants of different mergers possess different amount of information about some parameters that affects all competing firms in the industry and hence each merger’s profitability. The merger decision of the informed firms will reveal valuable information. Uninformed firms could imperfectly updated merger related information and change their merger incentive. Anticipating such responses, the informed firms in turn alter their merger decisions. We find in equilibrium, information transmission enhances complementary between mergers. In some cases, it transfers mergers from strategic substitutes into strategic complements. With enhanced complementary, mergers are more likely to occur in waves under incomplete information. Our finding has implications for merger review policies.